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The feeling of antipathy towards the witness who
is involved in illegal activity and testifies against his
fellow culprits precedes modern history. Western
civilization has been taught to despise the "toady,"
the informer, the spy, the turncoat and the tattle-
tale. In every instance, the witness granted immun-
ity from prosecution is himself guilty of crime-why
else seek immunity? Before an intelligent discus-
sion of the right or wrong of the grant of immunity
-or whether it is a prosecutorial tool that our sys-
tem should continue to condone-it is worth a back-
ward look at history to determine how the "accomp-
lice witness" fell into such universal disrepute.
The great historical references to vile men who
betrayed their companions all involve people who
have, for one reason or another, sold out a "holy"
cause. Judas Iscariot, one can surmise, was a
patriotic citizen if judged from the standpoint of the
loyal Romans. Benedict Arnold came to his senses
and returned as a loyal British subject, according to
British history of the American Revolution. "The
Informer," so despised by O'Flaherty, sold out Irish
freedom, but British history would treat him more
kindly. These three, and thousands of others, had the
bad luck of selecting the losing side; the holy winners
have damned them through history. Conversely,
losers have unleashed contempt on spies and turn-
coats that picked the winners. Does anyone wonder
how the British viewed Nathan Hale? Or, for that
matter, the whole group of men we call "our
Founding Fathers"?
The fact is that our hatred for and detestation of
the accomplice witness (or dirty spy) is rooted in our
belief in the cause they betrayed, not the act itself.
This lesson is taught so strongly that we frequently
*J.D. DePaul University 1952; United States Attor-
ney, Northern District of Illinois 1970-1971; Judge
of the United States District Court, Northern District of
Illinois 1971-1975; presently serving as Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The
author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Robert
McAllister, J.D. Loyola University 1974, who willingly
devoted much time and effort in the preparation of this
article.
fail to recognize that it is not a betrayal of the
"cause" (i.e., society) to seek the testimony of one
guilty man in order to bring to justice other crimi-
nals. Further, the use of the informer as a weapon in
modern criminal practice under the rule of law is an
attempt to prevent the destruction of society, a
method of preserving the "holy cause," or justice,
and not a betrayal of it.
From the viewpoint of the crime syndicate, the
"squealer" may be a reprehensible man; from the
viewpoint of society he is, for whatever reason,
rendering a service to all the rest of us. So the
informer, spy, or accomplice witness is to be detested
and hated only if one is willing to accept the fact that
the men "betrayed" are not engaged in an act or acts
that are socially destructive, and probably only if the
act or acts are socially constructive.
Once we have crossed the hurdle of a school-boy's
reluctance to accept the tattle-tale and admit that
great social good can and does flow from the use of
informants, ' we can advance to the more perplexing
problem: What inducements are permissible or
acceptable to acquire accomplice testimony? We can,
I assume, rule out torture, threats or drugs.2 We can
also rule out any invasion of constitutional rights
such as imprisonment without trial or forfeiture of
estate. So we must seek other routes.
One of the most common inducements-and one
generally accepted-is the plea bargain. The prose-
cutor and/or the judge will be less severe in punish-
ment if the offender cooperates in present or future
trials against other defendants. For purposes of ar-
riving at the final conclusion, it makes no difference
whether the bargain goes to the charge or the
punishment; the effect is exactly the same. Another
inducement is the offer of safety: the government
'Deep Throat"-an informer-really had more to do
with the Watergate expos6 than research investigation. For
that matter, Judge Sirica did not induce the burglars to
"talk" by any ardent lecture on the morality of "telling
all."
2 ee Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Town-
send v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Ashcroft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143 (1944); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940).
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agrees to protect the informer against reprisals from
his companions in crime.5 But perhaps the most
controversial is the present topic of discussion: the
grant of immunity from prosecution.
The tradition of compelled testimony runs deep in
legal history. Professor Wigmore noted that as early
as the fifteenth century recalcitrant witnesses were
ordered to testify against their neighbors by use of a
summons procedure.' The Statute of Elizabeth, 5 on
the books in the sixteenth century, authorized courts
to compel testimony and punish witnesses who
refused to testify after service of process; thatjudicial
power still is firmly entrenched in our legal system
today.' The modern day concept that every citizen
has a duty to testify and that the government is
entitled to every man's evidence' has ancient origins.
In 1612 Lord Bacon stated that "all subjects,
without distinction of degrees, owe to the King
tribute and service, not only of their deed and hand,
but of their knowledge and discovery." 'Today, in a
modern democracy not even a citizen with the
equivalent of a king's stature can avoid giving his
evidence. '
The only protection a citizen has against being
compelled to come forward and tell all is the fifth
amendment. " Its adoption was in large part caused
' Frequently, because of the witness' former involvement
in organized crime, the government will provide the witness
with a new identity, name, employment, and relocation in
another part of the country in exchange for testimony. Such
action is necessary to prevent reprisals for testifying.
4
See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2190, at 65 (J.
McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
55 ELIZ. 1, c. 9 § 12 (1562), which reads in the lan-
guage of the sixteenth century, "An Act For the Punyshe-
ment of Suche Persones as Shall Procure or Comit any
Ulyllful Perjurye." The statute authorized a penalty and
civil action against anyone who refused to testify after
service of process and payment of expenses. See 8 Win-
MORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2190-93 (J. McNaughton rev. ed.
1961). See generally L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH
AIENDM ENT (1968).
'Rule 45(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
Failure by any person without adequate excuse to
obey a subpoena served upon him may be deemed in
contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued.
'United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972).
'Speech of Sir Francis Bacon, in Countess of Shrewsbu-
ry's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1369, as quoted in 2 How. St. Tr.
770, 778 (K.B. 1612).
'Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,710 (1974).
"°U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "No person
. shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself...." This privilege has also
been extended to the States. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964). Throughout its legal history this constitutional
by the public outrage in England over the use of the
Star Chamber and the whipping of witnesses who
refused to testify. Seventeenth century England had
already adopted a common law privilege of silence,
i.e., "no man is bound to answer any question that
tends to make him accuse himself, or subject him to
any penalties," " which may have been the forerun-
ner of the fifth amendment privilege embodied in the
United States Constitution.
The power to compel testimony in the United
States was clearly recognized in the Constitution "2as
well as the first Judiciary Act of 1789. " However, the
co-extensive fifth amendment privilege was never
ignored. The privilege against self-incrimination
could always be asserted regardless of whether the
proceeding was crimainal, civil, administrative, or
investigative. i4 It guarantees every witness the right
to refuse to answer any question that he reasonably
believes could be used in a criminal prosecution
against him. '5 But it is a privilege only the witness
enjoys. It is a personal right which cannot be
conveyed to another-generally not even one's
lawyer. 56
In order to protect a witness' fifth amendment
privilege while still obtaining evidence necessary to
prosecute crime, immunity statutes were devised. A
number of statutes were passed by Congress in the
nineteenth century granting immunity from crimes
revealed by witness testimony. 17 The question of
prohibition has been a constant source of legal argument,
maneuver and sometimes manipulation. See E. GRISWOLD,
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955); L. LEVY, ORIGINS
OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968); Pittman, The Colonial
and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self
Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935).




U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor... "1 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 73.
" Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 94
(1964) (Whitej, concurring); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266
U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
t"Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951);
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
1 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) and In re
January 1976 Grand Jury, Edward M. Genson v. United
States, No. 76-1065,(7th Cir., decided Mar. 29, 1976) hold
that an attorney has no standing to assert his client's fifth
amendment privilege. However, this is not a per se rule, as
the court states in Genson there is recent conflict among the
circuits.
7
Immunity laws were enacted in 1857, 1862 and 1868.
See Note, Compelled Testimony with Immunity: Apply-




the scope of immunity was first reviewed by the
Supreme Court in the decision of Counselman v.
Hitchcock"0 in 1892. The Court in a very broad
decision found the immunity statute 9 lacking in
protecting the witness' fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. The Court stated:
We are clearly of [the] opinion that no statute which
leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after
he answers the criminating questions put to him, can
have the effect of supplanting the privilege [against self
incrimination] conferred by the Constitution of the
United States. . . . In view of the constitutional
provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must
afford absolute immunity against future prosecution
for the offense to which the question relates.2
Because the Counselman decision talked in terms
of absolutes, Congress reacted by amending the
immunity statute to require that a grant of immunity
cover "any transaction, matter, or thing,"' 21 about
which a witness could possibly testify. In Brown v.
Walker 22 the Supreme Court gave approval to the
new, amended immunity statute. Various state and
subsequent federal statutes were based on the statute
approved in Brown. 2 The American criminal justice
system thus operated on a concept of transactional
immunity for the next seventy-five years. 1
There are several varieties of immunity. Certain of
these-the informal immunity offered by law en-
forcement agents or the unwritten or non-court
approved agreement of the prosecutor not to prose-
cute-are beyond the scope of this discussion.
25
What is obviously the area of current concern is the
1142 U.S. 547 (1892).
"The statute, Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37,
provided:
[No... evidence obtained by means of any judicial
proceeding from any party or witness... shall be
given in evidence, or in any manner used against
such party or witness.., in any court of the United
States, in respect to any crime, or for the enforce-
ment of any penalty or forfeiture...
20142 U.S. 585-86 (emphasis added).
21Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443.
22161 U.S. 591 (1896).
2 
See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2281 n.11 (J.
McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
"'Transactional immunity was consistently affirmed
from the time of Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547
(1892), until the passage of 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970), which
provided for use immunity. Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S.
179 (1954); United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943);
United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); McCarthy
v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43 (1906).2 1See generally Comment, Judicial Supervision of Non-
Statutory Immunity, 65 J. CR.IM. L. & C. 334 (1974).
compelled testimony of an "accomplice" witness;
that is, the stripping of the fifth amendment privi-
lege from a potential witness by granting him, with
or without his consent, immunity from prosecution,
either general or limited. The general immunity
grants a witness freedom from prosecution from any
crime that might be covered by testimony elicited
from him after the conferring of immunity. The
limited "use" immunity simply prevents the prose-
cution from using the elicited testimony for either
investigative leads to incriminate the witness or the
testimony itself in any prosecution. Independently
developed evidence can still be used to prosecute the
witness, even for the crime discussed in the com-
pelled testimony. Obviously even a general grant of
immunity does not confer upon the witness a right
to lie, and false testimony may still subject the wit-
ness to a charge of perjury.26
IMMUNITY IN THE MODERN CONTEXT
The genesis of today's use of derivative use
immunity can be found in Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission, 27 where the witnesses refused to
answer questions despite grants of immunity from
state authorities because they believed they would
be incriminating themselves under federal laws.20
The Court prohibited the federal government from
using the compelled testimony in a subsequent pro-
ceeding. The Court's language was quite note-
worthy, Justice Goldberg stating for the Court that
[We] hold the constitutional rule to be that a state wit-
ness may not be compelled to give testimony which
may be incriminating under federal law unless the
compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in
any manner by federal officials in connection with a
criminal prosecution against him. 29
The new standard enunciated in Murphy was a
sharp deviation from the Counselman prohibition.
Counselman, by requiring full or absolute transanc-
tional immunity, prevented any prosecution for a
2618 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) provides in part:
[NJo testimony or other information compelled under
the order ... may be used against the witness in
any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury,
giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to com-
ply with the order.
Cf Note, Statutory Immunity and the Perjury Exception,
10 CALIF. W.L. REv. 428 (1974).
27378 U.S. 52 (1964).
"0 In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1965), the Supreme
Court held that the fourteenth amendment required the
states to guarantee their citizens the fifth amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination.
2 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 79.
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criminal act described in the testimony. Murphy
narrowed the scope so that a witness was not totally
immunized. Rather, a witness could not be prose-
cuted for criminal acts revealed in his testimony so
long as the evidence presented against him was not
derived directly or indirectly from his compelled
testimony.
In 1970 Congress passed'the Organized Crime
Control Act, 3 0 which established use immunity on the
federal level. 3" Two years later when the Supreme
Court approved the new act's adoption of use
immunity in Kastigar v. United States, 32 Justice
Powell stated the majority opinion as follows:
We hold that such immunity from use and deriva-
tive use is co-extensive with the scope of the privilege
against self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to
compel testimony over a claim of the privilege. While a
grant of immunity must afford protection commensu-
3018 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) provides:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or pro-
vide other information in a proceeding before or
ancillary to-
(1) a court or grandjury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint com-
mittee of the two Houses, or a commit-
tee or subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding commu-
nicates to the witness an order issued under this part,
the witness may not refuse to comply with the order
on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination;
but no testimony or other information compelled
under the order (or, any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other infor-
mation) may be used against the witness in any
criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving
a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with
the order.
31The legislative history of section 6002 clearly indicates
that Congress intended that the protection provided the
individual by a grant of immunity under this statute was to
be limited to the using of his compelled testimony against
him in a criminal proceeding. That history states:
Title II is a general Federal immunity statute that
will afford "use" immunity rather than "transaction"
immunity when a witness before a court, grand jury,
Federal agency, either House of Congress, or a con-
gressional committee or subcommittee, asserts his
privilege against self-incrimination. It is contem-
plated that the title will enable effective displace-
ment of the privilege against self-incrimination by
granting protection coextensive with the privilege;
that is, protection against the use of compelled testi-
mony directly or indirectly against the witness in a
criminal proceeding.
H. R. RFP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1970).
" 406 U.S. 441 (1972). See also Zicarelli v. New Jersey,
406 U.S. 472 (1972).
rate with that afforded by the privilege, it need not be
broader.
• ..The broad language in Counselman [requir-
ing absolute transactional immunity] . . . was unneces-
sary to the Court's decision, and cannot be considered
binding authority."
The Kastigar decision is buttressed by the princi-
ple that a necessary and essential power of govern-
ment is to compel testimony.3" That power is only
limited by the fifth amendment privilege which, in
the words of Justice Douglas, is the "safeguard of
conscience and human dignity and freedom of
expression."" The dissents of Justices Douglas and
Marshall record for history the numerous arguments
against limiting the scope of immunity. 3 6 However,
for the present,"1 the battle is over; use immunity can
be granted in the federal system.3 8 Thus, our
discussion centers around the proper implementation
of use immunity in the administration of the criminal
justice system.
"United States v. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453-55 (foot-
notes and citations omitted).
"Citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,
93-94 (1964), Justice Powell states:
Among the necessary and most important of the
powers of the States as well as the Federal Govern-
ment to assure the effective functioning of government
in an ordered society is the broad power to compel
residents to testify in court or before grand juries or
agencies. . . . Such testimony constitutes one of
the Government's primary sources of information.
406 U.S. at 444 (citation omitted).
"See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 445
(1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also United States v.
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 467 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
36406 U.S. at 462 (Douglas, J., dissenting); 406 U.S. at
467 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"Although the make-up of the Court has changed since
Justice Douglas retired, there is little chance that a
majority of the Court would require full transactional
immunity in the near future. Only Justice Douglas and
Justice Marshall dissented in Kastigar. Justices Brennan
and Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision.
However, Justice Brennan has previously stated his
opposition to use and derivative use immunity in Piccirillo
v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 552 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Therefore at this time there are only two sitting
justices (Brennan and Marshall) who are on record against
use or derivative use immunity. Of course, the opponents of
use immunity could continue their battle in Congress.
"There are a number of transactional immunity statutes
that have special applicability to various federal agency and
administrative proceedings. When use immunity was added
to the federal code it repealed or amended all inconsistent
sections of law. Whether all laws providing transactional
immunity were repealed is unclear. See Act of Oct. 15, 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 259, 84 Stat. 922. As a practical




The enactment of any immunity statutes stems
from the need of the government prosecutor to obtain
evidence that is otherwise unavailable. The decision
as to which type of immunity to grant rests upon a
number of factors that may be present: how badly is
the testimony of the proposed witness needed, how
strong is the case against the witness, is the witness in
some sense a "victim" even though he participated in
some criminal activity, and so forth. The obvious
example would be the "victim" of official extortion;
that is, the citizen who pays a public official either to
do his duty or refrain from doing his duty. The
witness has, in fact, participated in a bribe, but
prosecutorial discretion (a very important considera-
tion in the whole process) may require that the
bribe-taker be prosecuted rather than the bribe-giver.
Let me discuss the rationalization for that last
statement. A public official who accepts a bribe,
regardless of whether it was solicited or offered, has
corrupted a public office and violated a public trust.
The elected or appointed public official has, in a
very real sense, agreed with society-the public at
large-to do a competent, honest job for the benefit
of all of us. He is, in fact, our agent and representa-
tive and acts in the name of the public. When he
deals behind our backs for his own benefit, he cor-
rupts us all. He is no more than a traitor, a man who
has betrayed his public trust and eroded the integ-
rity of society and government.
This is not to suggest that the bribe-giver is not to
be condemned. To participate in public corruption,
even as a private citizen, is reprehensible and
criminal. Faced, however, with the choice-as fre-
quently happens-of prosecuting a bribe-giver or a
public bribe-taker, the public would seem to be better
served by the exposure and prosecution of the
bribe-taker.
It is not sufficient to suggest that both should be
prosecuted; given that option, all prosecution would
be easier in the public corruption cases. The fact is,
strong evidence may be available that a private
citizen has given a bribe (bank records, large cash
flow, testimony of employees and the like), but no
evidence exists as to whom he gave the bribe unless
the briber can be compelled to disclose his partner-
in-crime. Now, the problem: to prosecute the briber
and permit the corrupt official to continue his
corruption or pursue the official at the sacrifice of
giving the private citizen immunity?
The above bribe case model is frequently encoun-
tered, particularly at a federal level. There are more
illustrations that require rather painful-and pains-
taking-scrutiny by the prosecution. For instance,
when a small-deal narcotics peddler is apprehended,
is it worthwhile to "deal" in immunity in order to
obtain testimony against the big wholesaler? When
can the government work to obtain, by giving
immunity, the testimony of the organized crime
"street soldier" in order to convict the bosses who are
insulated from the overt acts of criminal conspiracy?
When can immunity be granted without doing
damage to the system of justice under which we
function; that is, when will society's needs best be
served by giving a guilty man immunity from
prosecution in exchange for testimony against other
criminals? These decisions can only be made by a
prosecutor of independence and integrity. It is a
subjective decision that cannot properly be made by a
court or, for that matter, a legislature.
The major problem of course is that a witness or
potential defendant who waives his fifth amendment
privilege in exchange for immunity walks away a free
man while other participants in the crime are
convicted on the basis of the immunized testimony.
The visceral reaction of the average citizen is usually
a feeling of disgust at such an unfair and unjust result
created when the witness is allowed to take a
so-called "immunity bath." ' 9 The adoption of use
immunity is an attempt to limit the amount of
immunity from prosecution a witness must now be
given. Use immunity prevents the witness from using
a grant of immunity as a shield from all future
prosecution for crimes or civil consequences of the
crime. The immunized witness may still be prose-
cuted for the crime so long as
no testimony or other information compelled under the
order (or any other evidence or information derived
from such testimony or other information) may be used
against the witness in any criminal case . . .40
A witness is prevented from taking an "immunity
bath," since a state or federal government may still
prosecute if it can demonstrate that the evidence it
uses is untainted. All the prosecution need show is
that the evidence is "derived from a legitimate source
wholly independent of the compelled testimony."
41
No longer can a witness use his fifth amendment
privilege as a sword to extricate himself from the
previous criminal conduct. The prosecutor or investi-
"9The legislative history of Title II contained in H.R.
REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), quoted in 2
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4017 (1970), states
specifically: "The proposed provision is not an immunity
bath." Thus it is clear that the intent of Congress was to
limit the extent of immunity.
4018 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970). See note 30 supra.
"' United States v. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460.
19761
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gating committee is not required to exchange free-
dom from all prosecution for evidence against other
defendants. It is also now clear that a person who
violates the law, receives immunity, and testifies is
not totally free of the consequences of his crime. That
person is still subject to many penalties and forfei-
tures. For example, a grant of use immunity does not
prohibit the use of the witness' testimony in civil
proceedings. Thus a witness who testifies about his
participation in a crime under a grant of use immu-
nity 2 may lose his job," or his license to practice
his profession, 4 4 in addition to subjecting himself to
civil liabilities4 5 as well as public infamy and dis-
grace. 46 Even a member of the judiciary stands to
be brought to task despite a grant of immunity. "
The fact that the testimony might subject the wit-
ness to criminal liabilities in another country does
not automatically give him a privilege from testify-
ing once immunity is granted. '8
"The Supreme Court's decision in Ullman v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), made it clear that under any
grant of immunity, transactional or use, a witness was
subject to civil penalties and forfeitures.
"Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
"See Note, The Intrusion of Federal Immunity
Protection into State Disbarment Proceedings, 7 LOYOLA
U.L.J. 58 (1976). The exact question of whether a
prosecutor may grant immunity from collateral civil pro-
ceedings as well as criminal proceedings remains undecided.
The article mentioned heretofore is an excellent analysis of
the issues involved in that situation. It is clear, however,
that a literal reading of the use immunity statute only
prevents use of the testimony in a criminal case. Disbar-
ment proceedings have been traditionally considered civil
proceedings.
41 Most notable are the civil tax liabilities that are created
by giving immunized testimony. See Patrick v. United
States, 524 F.2d 1109, 1118-19 (7th Cir. 1975) where the
court stated:
Patrick's Fifth Amendment privilege against being
compelled to be a witness against himself in any
criminal case does not afford him protection against
giving testimony that will disclose his civil liability
unless, of course, that testimony may subject him to
criminal prosecution. The grant of immunity removed
his only legitimate objection to giving the government
an honest and complete statement, even if compelled,
of the facts which may give rise to gambling tax
liability. Unlike a forfeiture or the imposition of a
fine, the jeopardy assessment is merely a method of
enforcing a civil obligation, rather than a form of
punishment.
"The fact that immunity statutes fail to shield the
witness against personal disgrace that often is an incident of
the relevation of one's connection with a crime does not
render the immunity inadequate in a constititional sense.
Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 147 (1949).
'7 Nepolitano v. Ward, 457 F.2d 279 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1037 (1972).
4 8Zicarelli v. New Jersey, 406 U.S. 472 (1972); In re
Tierney, 465 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Critics of use immunity contend that the new
standard does not leave the witness in the same
position he would have been in had he remained
silent."' If an immunized witness remains silent he
can be incarcerated for a substantial period of time. "
If the immunized witness testifies, he is not com-
pletely free of subsequent prosecution or other civil
penalties. They argue further that the defendant is
subject to the good faith of the prosecuting attorneys,
since the information relevant to the question of the
use of the evidence or taint is uniquely within the
prosecutor's possession. In short, the major com-
plaint is that under use immunity the defendant is
granted far less than is taken away. However, the
key point that the detractors of use immunity ignore
is that immunity is only required to be co-extensive
with protection afforded by the fifth amendment.
Doe, 361 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Pa), aff'd, 485 F.2d 678
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1973). See text
accompanying notes 73-77 infra.
"See generally Comment, The Fifth Amendment and
Compelled Testimony: Practical Problems in the Wake
of Kastigar, 19 VILL. L. REV. 470 (1974); Recent De-
velopment, Criminal Procedure-Immunty: Fifth
Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Eclipsed
by Use Immunty,, 48 WAsH. L. REx'. 711 (1973). A wit-
ness who refuses to testify has no right to remain
silent once immunity is granted. If an immunized
witness refuses to testify he can be sent to jail until
he agrees to testify. A witness may be compelled to
testify under a grant of immunity even after he has been
acquitted. Cf In re Bork, No. 75-1925 (7th Cir., decided
Oct. 29, 1975); In re Persico, 492 F.2d 1156, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 924 (1975).
1028 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970) provides:
(a) Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or
ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United
States refuses without just cause shown to comply
with an order of the court to testify or provide other
information, including any book, paper, document,
record, recording or other material, the court, upon
such refusal, or when such refusal is duly brought to
its attention, may summarily order his confinement at
a suitable place until such time as the witness is
willing to give such testimony or provide such infor-
mation. No period of such confinement shall exceed
the life of-
(1) the court proceeding, or
(2) the term of the grand jury, including
extensions,
before which such refusal to comply with the court
order occurred, but in no event shall such confinement
exceed eighteen months.
(b) No person confined pursuant to subsection (a) of
this section shall be admitted to bail pending the
determination of an appeal taken by him from the
order for his confinement if it appears that the appeal
is frivolous or taken for delay. Any appeal from an
order of confinement under this section shall be
disposed of as soon as practicable but not later than
thirty days from the filing of such appeal.
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As the Court clearly stated in Kastigar:
The privilege has never been construed to mean that
one who invokes it cannot subsequently be prosecuted.
Its sole concern is to afford protection against being
"forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of
'penalties affixed to . . .criminal acts."' 1
The current use immunity statute was not de-
signed to strip a witness of his fifth amendment
rights. The purpose of immunity is to obtain infor-
mation needed to prosecute and end criminal activ-
ity; such information will probably not be obtained
by any other means. It was intended to obtain every
man's evidence for the benefit of society while
preserving the individual's constitutional right not to
accuse himself. The importance of the fifth amend-
ment is perhaps best summarized in Erwin Gris-
wold's oft-quoted phrase that: "[Tihe privilege
against self-incrimination is one of the greatest
landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civil-
ized." 52 Nevertheless, the fifth amendment is not a
technique that was incorporated into the Bill of
Rights to inhibit effective law enforcement and pro-
tect thiose citizens who choose to violate the law. Nor
was the fifth amendment intended to insulate wit-
nesses from the personal hardship or liabilities that
the revelation of one's connection with a crime can
bring.
There have recently been a host of arguments
against allowing prosecutors free reign in granting
use immunity. 5 The primary claim is that evidence
obtained through use immunity is inherently unrelia-
ble since the witness might testify to whatever is
expected of him without necessarily telling the truth.
As a former prosecutor and trial judge, I believe this
argument fails to face reality. Any experienced
prosecutor knows that his immunized witness will be
subject to a brutal cross-examination at trial. Thus
no prosecutor offers immunity to a witness without
first receiving an off-the-record proffer of
testimony.5 4 Prosecutors, like judges and juries,
51406 U.S. at 453.
52See E. GRISWOLD, FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7
(1955).
53 Wolfson, Immunity, Right or Wrong? Wrong!, 57
Cm. B. RECORD 174 (1976); Wolfson, Immunity-How It
Works in Real Life, 67 J. CRist. L. & C. - (1976);
Comment, supra note 25, at 335.
54A proffer of testimony is a technique whereby the
prosecutor requests counsel for the defense to state an
off-the-record summary of answers that the witness will
give to the questions of the prosecutor or the grand jury. If
the answers by the witness are material to the investigation
and in fact are privileged by the fifth amendment the prose-
cutor then offers a formal grant of immunity in exchange for
an on-the-record repetition of the answers by the witness
approach the offer of immunized testimony on the
qui vive. With this attitude the prosecutor can then
examine the testimony, check for corroborating facts,
and make an independent judgment as to its overall
reliability. Often times a prosecutor's entire case
stands to win or lose on the key testimony of the
immunized witness."5 Consequently only a totally
inept prosecutor would rely upon immunized evi-
dence that was not clearly factually accurate. In
addition, if the witness is granted immunity, then lies
before the grand jury, or at trial, he is subject to
being prosecuted for perjury.5 Thus, the witness
himself has strong incentives to testify truthfully.
Some members of the criminal bar have advocated
a sort of mini-hearing before each grant of immun-
ity is extended. Such a proposal would involve a
hearing before a member of the judiciary, with the
prosecutor, counsel for witnesses and potential de-
fendants present. Witnesses would present their
testimony and theoretically the defendants would
present objections to the testimony as being untrue
or unreliable. Then the judge could rule on the re-
liability of the immunized testimony and on whether
or not the testifying witness as opposed to other par-
ticipants in the crime (who were supposedly more
culpable) is the proper person to receive immunity.
The mini-hearing concept is an improvident idea
for a number of reasons. First, no member of the
judiciary currently has the legal power to review the
prosecutor's choice in deciding which parties to
prosecute and which parties to immunize.57 The
himself either before the grand jury or in court. See
Skinner, Immunity, Right or Wrong? Right!, 57 CH. B.
RECORD 168, 172 (1976).
55 Crimes which by their nature only involve two parties,
e.g., bribery, extortion, gambling, prostitution, etc., are
often difficult to prosecute because there is no complaining
witness. Without the testimony of one of the participants,
generally there can be no prosecution.
5618 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) states:
[N]o testimony ... may be used against the witness
in any criminal case, except a prosecution for per-
jury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to
comply with the order.
57However, it is clear that the court under its supervi-
sory powers can regulate immunity where it is obviously
abused by members of the executive branch. For instance,
in United States v. Paiva, 294 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C.
1969) the court dismissed an indictment, stating:
[WIhen the conduct of an officer of the
executive branch becomes enmeshed in the judicial
process, the courts have the power and resulting duty
to supervise that conduct to the extent it uses the
judicial administration of criminal justice.
In that case the court's dismissal of the case was not an
attempt to grant the prosecutor's broken promise of
immunity but rather an attempt to deter blatant govern-
ment misconduct. Cf Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
1976]
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power to decide whether a grant of immunity to a
particular witness would serve the public interest is
intimately interwoven with the concept of prosecu-
torial discretion. A large degree of flexibility is
therefore justified since this policy determination is
necessarily one within the executive agency's exclu-
sive area of expertise. " Under our historical princi-
ple of separate but co-equal branches of government
the judicial involvement in the executive branch's
decision would clearly be unwarranted. 9
Second, the mini-hearing procedure would seri-
ously jeopardize the rights of other citizens. For
instance, consider the situation where witness A at
such a hearing states publicly and in open court that
B extorted money from A and B failed to report the
funds on his income tax return. Now, the govern-
ment may choose not to grant immunity to A either
because it believes the testimony is untrue, or be-
cause it believes it cannot successfully prosecute B
because of other reasons, such as insufficient admis-
sible evidence or the fact that the statute of limita-
tions has run. Even if B is innocent he is severely
injured by the publicity of A's testimony in open
court at the mini-hearing. Further, and more im-
portant, B has no way to defend his name or clear
himself of the accusation because the prosecutor h's
chosen not to present formal charges against him.
Of course the mini-hearings could all be heard "in
camera," but as experience has demonstrated, the
press usually discovers the testimony through infor-
mal methods. The mere fact that the court is
conducting a mini-hearing would arouse the curiosity
and suspicion of the public, court employees, and
especially the press corps. Finally, federal courts
would be presented with a difficult jurisdictional
problem unless Congress enacted legislation to pro-
vide for such hearings. 60
(1972); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); In
re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v.
McLeod, 385 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1967); Williamson v.
United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied
381 U.S. 950 (1964); United States ex rel. Berberion v.
Cliff, 300 F. Supp. 8, 13 (E.D.Pa. 1969).
"5 In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1973).
"9That Congress intended the traditional separation of
powers concept to apply to immunity is indicated by the
legislative history. See H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970), quoted in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4007, 4018 (1970), where it stated: "The Court's role in
granting the order is merely to find the facts on which the
order is predicated." See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S.
at 431-34; In re Russo, 448 F.2d 369, 373 (9th Cir. 1971);
United States v. DiMauro, 441 F.2d 428, 437 (8th Cir.
1971); cf. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 317 F. Supp.
792, 796 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
" A criminal prosecution in the district court may only be
Involving the judicial branch in the decision to
grant immunity is no real resolution of the problem.
Under our current system a judge or magistrate is
occasionally called upon to issue warrants. Unlike
the granting of immunity, the decision to issue a
search warrant generally involves only a fairly
straightforward question of probable cause. On the
-other hand, securing prior judicial approval for
grants of immunity involves a legion of very difficult
factual questions as well as policy decisions."6 It is
apparent that the mini-hearing would create difficult
questions of "justiciability.""62
Another frequent argument made against immu-
nity is that it enables a zealous prosecutor to select
targets of prosecution for his own personal gain or to
advance or inhibit a particular ideology. It is true
that an improper use of the grand jury and the power
to grant immunity can be used to harass witnesses by
requiring them to travel great distances or suffer the
political and social consequences of being under
investigation. 3 In reality however it is not the
instituted by an indictment or information. See 8
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 7.02 (2d ed. 1971). The
fifth amendment also provides that "no person shall be held
to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ...."
U.S. CONST. amend V. Consequently, it is conceptually
difficult to conceive of an underlying jurisdictional basis for
a mini-hearing on immunity. Previously, in Ullman v.
United States, 350 U.S. at 434, the Supreme Court stated
that:
Since the Court's duty under [the immunity stat-
ute] is only to ascertain whether the
statutory requirements are complied with by the
grand jury, the United States Attorney, and the
Attorney General, we have no difficulty in concluding
that the district court is confined within the scope of
"judicial power."
1 Many factors are involved in a prosecutor's decision to
prosecute; for example: Has sufficient legally admissible
evidence been discovered to prove the government's case
beyond a reasonable doubt? Is there any conduct on the
part of a government agency or official which endangers
successful prosecution? Would the prosecution merely be
repetitive of actions taken by a state prosecutor? Does the
criminal conduct justify the expense and allocation of
available resources to prosecute? Could the accused,
because of age, physical or mental condition, qualify for
deferred prosecution?
62Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); United
States v. Cox, !42 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 935 (1965); Note, Judicial Enforcement of
Nonstatutory "Immunity Grants". Abrogation by Anal-
ogy, 25 HAST. L. REV. 435 (1974).
63There is no doubt that the grand jury process may be
used as a political weapon against political dissidents. One
investigation by the Internal Security Division of the
Justice Department spanned ten cities and subpoenaed 200
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prosecutor's ability to grant immunity that provides
the potential for abuse. Immunity is only an effective
device when it is clear that a crime exists. The
prosecutor always had the power to select the party
to prosecute. 6' Immunity is ideally a device which
enables a prosecutor to investigate and prosecute
crime. If in fact immunity grants are utilized,
convictions secured, and crime curtailed, then it can
be said that immunity may have helped a prosecu-
tor's reputation and thus enhanced his political
possibilities. However, in that sense, immunity is the
same as hard work, thorough investigation, and
effective trial presentation. Charges that immunity
grants are being used politically stem from the
increasing attacks made on official corruption65 in
the last five years.
The choice of which party to immunize is always
difficult. Some prosecuting attorneys maintain a
policy of immunizing the first witness to come
forward. Such a policy is only proper when all the
participants in the crime are equally culpable. The
better practice, and the one that the Justice Depart-
ment generally requires, is to bring the prosecution
which furthers the "public interest." Our present
form of statutory immunity requires the involvement
of a number of different people who each make an
independent determination of the circumstances sur-
rounding the potential immunity grant." Initially,
the Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the
case must make a determination based on his
intimate knowledge of the case. Next, the United
States Attorney for the district must determine
persons. See Comment, Federal Grand Jury Investigation
of Political Dissidents, 7 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. LIB. L.
REV. 432, 433 (1972). However, abuse of immunity grants
to politically harass has become highly improbable in light
of Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972).
6 By federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1970), the U.S.
Attorney is vested with authority to prosecute all offenses
against the United States. He has the power to select whom
to prosecute and under which particular parts of the
criminal code. United States v. Marshall, 463 F.2d 1211,
1212 (5th Cir. 1972); cf. Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709,
713 (4th Cir. 1967).
"'The cases brought in the Northern District of Illinois
involving public officials have brought the question of
immunity to the attention of the public. Cf. United States v.
Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Wigoda, 521 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 464 (1975); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 966 (1974).
"'See Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d at 1075;
Thornburgh, Reconciling Effective Federal Prosecution
and the Fifth Amendment: "Criminal Coddling," "The
New Torture," or "A Rational Accomodation"?, 67 J.
CRm. L. & C. 155 (1976).
whether the public interest is best served either by
granting immunity or by attempting to proceed to
trial on other evidence. Obviously the U.S. Attor-
ney's decision takes into account such factors as the
probability of conviction, the magnitude of the
offense, and the culpability of the witness in relation
to all others who may have been involved. Approval
for the grant of immunity must be secured from the
Attorney General in Washington. The local U.S.
Attorney must demonstrate that a serious crime is
involved and that the witness has evidence of great
import to present. The Attorney General has the
authority to reject an application for immunity.
67
When commentators argue against allowing unfet-
tered power to remain in the hands of the prosecu-
tor, their arguments should be directed against the
use or abuse of the entire criminal justice process
and not against the concept of use immunity. An in-
nocent person can be brought before the grand jury
by an unscrupulous prosecutor and easily harrassed
and intimidated because of his religious, political or
philosophical beliefs even when there is no evidence
that a crime has been committed. But the granting of
immunity does not involve an innocent person.
Immunity is only granted to a participant in a crime
in an attempt to convict other participants.
The granting of immunity can occasionally place a
witness in a dire situation. For instance, a witness
who is granted immunity often has no protection
from reprisals of fellow criminals. Unfortunately, the
choice may result in refusing to talk and going to jail,
or talking and facing the threat of death. This was
the argument raised in LaTona v. United States, 68
where the witness made a due process argument
(instead of the usual self-incrimination argument)
that he would literally be deprived of "life, liberty, or
property without due process in violation of the fifth
amendment" if he should be required to testify before
the grand jury pursuant to a grant of immunity. The
Court properly rejected the claim, quoting a very
pertinent hypothetical example from the Supreme
Court in Piemonte v. United States:69
If two persons witness an offense-one being an
innocent bystander and the other an accomplice who is
67The fact that the Attorney General has the power to
reject a request for immunity does not mean that a witness
has a right to object to a grant of immunity where the
guidelines for submitting requests to the Justice Depart-
ment were not followed by the local U.S. Attorney. As stated
in In re Tierney, 465 F.2d at 813, the guidelines "are not
directed to the procedural or substantive rights of prospec-
tive witnesses."
68449 F.2d 121, 122 (8th Cir. 1971).
69367 U.S. 556 (1961).
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thereafter imprisoned for his participation-the latter
has no more right to keep silent than the former. The
Government of course has an obligation to protect its
citizens from harm. But fear of reprisal offers an
immunized prisoner no more dispensation from testify-
ing than it does any innocent bystander without a
record."°
Although most persons would sympathize with a
witness who found himself in the position where he
faced bodily harm or jail depending upon his choice
to accept immunity, that sympathy clearly should not
lead to engrafting a privilege upon the heretofore
sacrosanct mandate of criminal law that every man
must come forward with his evidence. Once again the
reason that there should be no privilege is that the
witness would not be in such a dire predicament but
for his criminal involvement.
Another frequent criticism of immunity is that it is
inherently unfair to the defendant because the gov-
ernment has the power to immunize witnesses but
the defendant has no power to compel testimony from
other witnesses on the same basis. There is an aspect
of inequality in the criminal process. But it is the
government who generally suffers from the inequal-
ity. It is the government which must come forward
with the evidence. It is the government which must
bear the burden of proving the defendant guilt)'
beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the government
which must overcome the defendant's presumption of
innocence. The criminal system was designed to
protect those charged with crimes from unwarranted
charges. Thus, it is appropriate that the system favor
the defendant. But the fact that the defense lacks
immunity power does not change a system of justice
in which the defendant always has the benefit of the
doubt.
In Kastigar Justice Powell noted that historically
the granting of immunity has been the sole preroga-
tive of the government. 7 Traditionally that preroga-
tive is supposed to be exercised sparingly. If the
power to grant immunity were given to defendants,
what would prevent them from showering their
co-defendants with immunity grants in order to
70449 F.2d at 122, quoting 367 U.S. at 559 n.2.
"1United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974);
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 450; United States v.
Bautista, 509 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. 1975); Smith v.
United States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1967). A recent
decision by the Ninth Circuit reaffirms the basic premise
that the defense witnesses will not normally be granted
immunity. However, the court allows that in some situa-
tions a defendant could be denied a fair trial by the
government's refusal to seek immunity for defense wit-
nesses. United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.
1976). See also Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534
n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
"beat the rap"? As stated earlier in this article, every
grant of immunity involves a social cost; i.e., an
admitted criminal is not prosecuted. Consequently,
the decision to immunize should be made in the
interest of society as a whole, and not in the interest
of a sole defendant who could choose to immunize on
the basis of friendship or self-interest. Certainly no
defendant has a constitutional right to a correspond-
ing power of immunity. As Judge Butzner noted in
In re Kdgo when reviewing this argument:
The sixth amendment assures an accused "compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." But the
authors of the Bill of Rights did not deem it essential to
enhance this right by empowering the accused to
confer immunity, and nowhere in the Constitution do
we find any justification for conditioning the govern-
ment's ability to grant immunity on a corresponding
grant to private individuals.72
Although I believe immunity is an effective law
enforcement tool, sometimes the granting of immu-
nity, regardless of its scope, can place a witness in a
situation where his fifth amendment privilege cannot
be adequately guarded. Take, for example, the
situation where a witness is granted immunity but
his testimony will jeopardize his freedom in another
jurisdiction in which the laws of the United States
have no application. This problem was presented
in Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of In-
vestigation" where the witness asserted that he
could not be compelled to testify before the commis-
sion because his testimony would expose him to
danger of foreign prosecution. The Court did not
reach the constitutional question, however, because it
believed that the appellant was never in real danger
of being compelled to disclose information that might
incriminate him under foreign law. " Thus the exact
parameters of the fifth amendment privilege remain
open when dealing with the possibility of foreign
prosecution. " But the Zicarelh decision leaves one
with the distinct impression that if the Court found
the threat of foreign prosecution to be real and
substantial, then the prosecutor would be unable to
compel testimony by granting immunity. Should the
Court reach the merits of this question in the future,
the probable outcome is that the fifth amendment
privilege will be extended to bar immunity when
712484 F.2d at 1222.
73406 U.S. 472 (1972).
14 Id. at 481.
7 5 In re Tierney, 465 F.2d at 811, states that "Whether
the reach of the Fifth Amendment is such as to protect
against foreign prosecution is an open question ... " In
light of the language of Zicarell,, the question may be
open but the possible answers are obvious.
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there is a real and substantial threat of foreign
prosecution.
A number of the appellate courts have faced this
problem and concluded that no threat of foreign
prosecution can exist when the immunized testimony
is only requested before the grand jury. 76 Since the
grand jury proceedings are secret, 77 the courts have
reasoned that there cannot be disclosure of the
testimony to persons in other jurisdictions, ergo, no
threat of foreign prosecution. Yet, that conclusion
ignores the fact that often the secrecy of the grand
jury proceedings is not preserved. The secrecy of
the grand jury can be breached in the event a wit-
ness' testimony is used to impeach or if perjury pro-
ceedings are instituted. Furthermore, one defend-
ant may be compelled to disclose a co-defendant's
grand jury testimony in order to defend against the
charges against himself. The better practice might be
to carve out an exception in this instance. When the
Supreme Court receives a case where there is a real
and substantial threat of foreign prosecution, they
may well choose to narrow the prosecutor's power to
grant immunity.
THE FUTURE OF IMMUNITY
Considering the future of use immunity statutes,
the major problem that will often recur involves
what constitutes evidence from an independent
source. In Kastigar the majority fashioned an evi-
dentiary principle which would serve under an ex-
clusionary rule. Justice Powell stated:
This total prohibition on use [of the immunized
testimony] provides a comprehensive safeguard, bar-
ring the use of compelled testimony as an "investiga-
7'1d.;In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969).
"Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that:
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury
other than its, deliberations and the vote of any juror
may be made to the attorneys for the government for
use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a
juror, attorney, interpreter, stenographer, operator of
a recording device, or any typist who transcribes
recorded testimony may disclose matters occurring
before the grand jury only when so directed by the
court preliminarily to or in connection with ajudicial
proceeding or when permitted by the court at the
request of the defendant upon a showing that grounds
may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment
because of matters occurring before the grand jury. No
obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any person
except in accordance with this rule. The court may
direct that an indictment shall be kept secret until the
defendant is in custody or has given bail, and in that
event the clerk shall seal the indictment and no person
shall disclose the finding of the indictment except,
when necessary for the issuance and execution of a
warrant or summons.
tory lead," and also barring the use of any evidence
obtained by focusing investigation on a witness as a
result of his compelled disclosures.
• . . This burden of proof. . . is not limited to a
negation of taint; rather, it imposes on the prosecution
the affirmative duty to prove that evidence it proposes
to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly
independent of the compelled testimony.
1 8
Justice Marshall vehemently disagreed with the
majority's characterizations of the new test as a
"comprehensive safeguard." 7 9 He feared that "the
government [would] have no difficulty in meeting its
burden by mere assertion if the witness produces no
contrary evidence." 8 0 Thus, he concluded, the good
faith of the prosecutor will be the sole safeguard of
the witness' rights. The few cases"1 that have dealt
with this problem would seem to allay Justice
Marshall's concern.
The Court's adoption in Kastigar of an exclusion-
ary type rule stemmed from the fact that Congress
designed the use immunity statute to have such an
effect .8' As a practical matter the enforcement of an
exclusionary rule by a pretrial suppression hearing
may not be necessary. There are a number of
situations in which a per se admissible rule can be
adopted. For example, suppose there are simul-
taneous state and federal investigations in which the
federal authorities conclude their investigation first,
and have sufficient evidence to convict the defend-
ant. Before a federal indictment is presented, the
state authorities grant use immunity to the defend-
ant. Query: Should the federal authorities be al-
lowed to try the defendant? Clearly the answer is
7 8Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 460 (footnote
omitted).
"Id. at 460.
80 Id. at 489 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"See United States v. First Western State Bank, 491
F.2d 780 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825
(1975); United States v. McDaniel, 449 F.2d 832 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 992 (1971).82 See HOUSE CO.INI. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON
ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1970, H.R. REP.
No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). One Congressman
stated:
[Tihe immunity grant would constitute
a ground for the suppression of the use of compelled
testimony and the fruits of that testimony, rather than
a total defense. It would be a use restriction, a use
restriction similar to the exclusionary rule which is
now applied against such things as involuntary confes-
sions, evidence acquired from unlawful searches and
seizures, evidence acquired in violation of the Miranda
warnings, to cite only a few examples. The witness
could be prosecuted for his crime under this bill,
provided the evidence used against him is independent




yes. In this situation there is no doubt that the fed-
eral authorities are not using the compelled testi-
mony and that their investigation was not derived
from the immunized testimony. The federal govern-
ment can establish the independence of its evidence
beyond all doubt simply by stating the dates of its
investigation and the fact that it did not cooperate
with the state authorities. This example is not at all
far fetched, since it is based in part on the facts of
United States v. First Western State Bank. 83 In that
case the Federal Bureau of Investigation had in-
vestigated various campaign contributions before
the state granted immunity. The court took on the
task of deciding whether the government met its
burden of showing that its evidence and investigation
were not derived from use of the compelled testi-
mony. The Eighth Circuit held that there was an
independent source and noted that a suppression
hearing might not always be the best method for
making a determination on the evidence, stating:
Not every case, however, would call for a further
fragmentation of the trial process by having a full-scale
suppression hearing prior to trial. The ascertaining of
independent sources can often be better considered
during the trial, since all the evidence is placed on the
record or offered for introduction at the trial.8
It seems that the best approach to dealing with
the tainted evidence problem would be to allow the
counsel for the defense to make a continuing objec-
tion throughout the trial against that evidence
which he believes was improper. Then, if at some
point it becomes clear to the trial judge that some
evidence or part of the investigation was derived
from the immunized testimony, a mistrial can be
declared. This procedure seems much more practica-
ble than a pretrial suppression hearing at which the
judge must make a determination without the bene-
fit of all the evidence the government eventually will
present. Of course, before beginning the trial some
type of initial screening process could be conducted;
i.e., the judge could request affidavits from the pros-
ecutor and investigator stating that they have not
used the immunized testimony in their investigation
or preparation of the case.
Those cases where the government meets its
burden of demonstrating the independence of its
evidence but admits that it has reviewed the com-
pelled testimony create the greatest danger. These
are the cases where the government could gain cer-
tain tactical or strategic advantages. Even though
their evidence and investigation may have been in-
83491 F.2d 780 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
825 (1975).
SId. at 787.
dependent, disclosure of the compelled testimony
could give away the strength and weaknesses of the
defense case. Decisions as to which witnesses to
cross-examine, not to cross-examine, to impeach, or
how to structure a certain argument become much
easier once the prosecutor has full knowledge of the
case. The Supreme Court has yet to delineate a pro-
cedure which would adequately eliminate these
subtle strategic advantages a prosecutor gains. How-
ever, it is clear that in this narrow class of cases the
comprehensive safeguard envisioned by the major-
ity in Kastigar is at least partially lacking. Further,
since in a criminal proceeding a defendant has a
rather circumspect right of disclosure 8 5 it is nearly
impossible for him to refute the government's con-
tention that it is not using information derived from
his previous testimony. 88
However, many of the fears created by the adop-
tion of use immunity are unwarranted. Rarely, if
ever, are defendants prosecuted after being granted
use immunity despite the fact that under the use im-
munity statute there is a potential for prosecution. 87
The right to grant immunity has, over many
years, proved an effective weapon of prosecution. It
is not enough to suggest that the use of such a
weapon is capable of abuse and, therefore, should
be curtailed or abolished. Any governmental func-
tion of authority is capable of abuse and can be at-
tacked with the same lance. The safeguards of law,
the intelligent appraisal of facts by judges and ju-
ries, and the proper defense of the accused by dili-
gent members of the bar all stand in the way of such
abuse. Misuse of any of the prosecutorial tools al-
ways spells disaster for the prosecution-and that
too remains a safeguard for those accused.
8 Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a) a
defendant has only the limited right to discover his own
prior statements made to the government, the results of
examinations and scientific tests, as well as his grand jury
testimony. But local rules such as N.D. ILL. CRuIM. R. 2.04
and the Supreme Court decision in Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), guarantee a defendant the right to obtain
evidence that is favorable to him. It is at least arguable that
a prosecutor who indicts a previously immunized witness
must disclose all his evidence before trial since, if the
defendant can show that it is derived from his previous
testimony, it is therefore favorable to him in that it would
result in a dismissal of the indictment.
86 See Comment, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled
Testimony: Practical Problems in the Wake of Kastigar,
19 VILL. L. REV. 470, 485-89 (1974).
"7The present United States Attorney for the Northern
District of Illinois has stated publicly that his office has
never indicted anyone who was previously granted use
immunity-except in cases involving perjury. Under the
former transactional immunity statute a perjury prosecu-
tion could always be brought.
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